A Veteran's Call for Caution in Frothy Markets

According to Bloomberg Markets, Bruce Richards, managing partner and head of CVC Marathon, discussed the favourite investing advice he has received throughout his career during a recent appearance on "Bloomberg Money" alongside hosts Scarlet Fu and Tom Keene. Bloomberg's summary of the interview highlights one piece of advice: "always remain liquid." Richards also warned about irrational markets and said he is not a fan of leveraged ETF structures.

In environments where credit markets lock up or risk appetite evaporates suddenly, liquidity becomes the asset that matters most. The ability to sell without conceding price—or at all—separates those who navigate crises from those who are caught holding unmarketable positions.

The Leveraged ETF Problem: Structural Fragility in Plain Sight

Richards' reservations about leveraged exchange-traded fund (ETF) structures point to well-documented mechanics. Leveraged ETFs—instruments that use derivatives and borrowing to amplify daily returns by 2x, 3x, or more—face a critical flaw: they are designed to track daily performance, not long-term returns. During periods of volatility, these products decay in value relative to their underlying indices, a phenomenon known as "volatility decay." When markets move sideways or downward in choppy fashion, holders of 3x leveraged equity or sector ETFs can experience cumulative losses that exceed the underlying index decline.

What Regulators Have Said About Daily-Reset Funds

US regulators flagged the same structural issue years ago. In Regulatory Notice 09-31, FINRA described leveraged and inverse ETFs as "highly complex financial instruments that are typically designed to achieve their stated objectives on a daily basis." It added that, "due to the effects of compounding, their performance over longer periods of time can differ significantly from their stated daily objective," and that funds reset daily "typically are unsuitable for retail investors who plan to hold them for longer than one trading session, particularly in volatile markets."

A simple calculation shows why. If an index rises 10% one day and falls 10% the next, it ends at 99% of its starting level (1.10 × 0.90 = 0.99), a 1% loss. A fund that delivers three times the daily move gains 30% and then loses 30%, ending at 91% of its starting value (1.30 × 0.70 = 0.91), a 9% loss. The index lost 1%; the 3x fund lost nine times as much, not three. The longer and choppier the holding period, the wider that gap can grow.

The Irrational Market Warning

Richards also warned about irrational markets, according to Bloomberg. The summary does not say which markets he meant. In past bubbles, irrational conditions have shown up as stretched valuations for assets with weakening fundamentals, strong demand for instruments with known structural weaknesses, and herding that discounts tail risks.

Liquidity as the Master Risk

The case for remaining liquid rests on a recurring pattern: liquidity can evaporate quickly, even in markets that appear deep. The repo market dysfunction of September 2019, the COVID-19 market dislocations of March 2020, and the gilt (UK bond) market crisis of September 2022 each demonstrated how quickly seemingly deep markets can freeze. When buyers vanish and sellers must move inventory, prices move not to reflect fundamentals but to clear whatever supply emerges.

Investors holding illiquid positions or leveraged bets can face severe drawdowns during liquidity crises. Those holding cash or unlevered, tradable assets are better placed to survive and to buy from forced sellers. The collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 and the UK gilt and LDI crisis of 2022 both showed how leverage turns a price move into forced selling.

Timing, Uncertainty, and the Prudent Response

Bloomberg's summary of the interview does not mention a forecast or a timeline. The advice fits a familiar risk-management posture: maintain discipline, stay liquid, avoid structures whose behaviour you do not fully understand, and be sceptical of markets that appear irrational. This is not market timing; it is risk management.

Conclusion: The Price of Complacency

Richards' message is not novel. Market history is littered with episodes in which warnings from experienced investors were dismissed during periods of euphoria, only to prove prescient after crashes. The 1990s were full of warnings about dot-com excess; 2004–2006 saw prescient calls on housing. Those who heeded such warnings and stayed liquid often looked overly cautious for a time before being vindicated.

Whether investors act on Richards' warning is an open question. The daily-reset mechanics of leveraged ETFs and the speed at which liquidity vanished in past episodes suggest it is at least worth weighing.

Further reading and context

Long-Term Capital Management Crisis (1998), The UK Gilt Crisis — Liability-Driven Investment, US Equity Markets — Are Valuations at Bubble Levels?.